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Hegel finished the preface to the first olume of hi Science of Logic on
Mar h 22, 1812 and gave it the subtitl "Obj ctive Logic: the Doc
trine of Being." 1 In September of the sam y ar Fi hte started to lec
ture on th relation between I gic and phi l sophy under the tille
Transcendental Logic. 2 Both thinkers hay R "inh Id and Bardil i 's uri
ous dualism in mind when they c:omment on th iniLial procedure
and the result of logic, b u t there is no reason to th ink they had each
other in view. 3 A comparative reading of the two texts i still enlight
ening, si n e it discovers with in the comm n sta11c of idealism differ nt
views about t he relation of thought and its obje l, about the starting
point of philosophical r flection, and whether thought arrives al full
determinacy or concretene in its result.
Fichte's conception of thought's fun tion and competence confine
h is philosophy to the stand point of fonnal idealism, or a heory of knowl
edge that is me taphy icall neutral ( or skeptical), and in fact invites
religious or th logi ·al completion. H g I' view of thought dctin
the standpoin t of objective idealism, where logic merges with metaphysics
and philosoph claim in and as a process of thinking not only to analyz
reality, but to define it. Despite Hegel's sugg stion that philosophy's
practi e ap p roximates the noesi noeuiJ of Aristotle's fir t mover. he
uses th melhodological stanc of idealism to avoid making ontologi
cal commitments, and so ends in metaphysical skepticism. I h JI arue that each thinker ends with a postmetaphysical view that stresses th
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limitations of.human cognition, though perhaps not in a ful1y straight
forward way, since each (consciously or unconsciously) conceals the
modesty of the human dwelling behind ari ornamental facade of theo
logical and metaphysical language, the function of which is not cogni
tive, but edifying.
These are abrupt claims that can be substantiated only by a more
detailed analysis of the two Logics. Since they contradict surface
understandings of Fichte and Hegel which are current, and which may
have been suggested by these authors themselves, I shall first ask how
the two systems sketched in 1812 stand as epistemologies and meta
physics. Then I shall explore the terms of the being-lhoughi relation,
considering each first for Fichte, then for Hegel. Since each philoso
pher's theory is dauntingly complex, these expositions will be presented
under separate headings, and comparisons also.
INITIAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE

1812

LOGICS

Fichte in 1812 seems to be much like the Kant he criticized as a dog
matist in 1794 and 1797, confining philosophy to the investigation of
the structures of consciousness, but talking nonetheless of an in-itself
or transcendent ground for knowledge and action. Wissenschaftslehre is
competent onl)' to explain the facts of consciousness, yet its construc
tion of empirical consciousness-derived from the supposedly univer
sal complementarity of image and formal being-is framed by talk of
being as such, independent, self-determining, conceived outside all ,
relation, negation, or relativity (Cp. TL 171 and 202-03). Though God
or Being cannot enter his philosophy proper, which is a genetic ac
count of appearances, and so explains solely from that being which is
correlated with image ( TL 316), Fichte nonetheless avers that the be
ing of appearances lies in God (TL 286). A philosophy of limited scope,
purporting only to explain the being-image complementarity in con
sciousness (and not in God), opens itself to theological or metaphysi~
cal supplement.
Hegel's self-developing system of thought-determinations, on the other
hand, remains a consistently transcendental venture-theory elaborated
to explain the possibility of meaningful cognition in all realms of hu
man experience. If Fichte's thought lead him back to traditional meta
physical (eventually skeptical) questions about the relationship betwee n
what is and what consciousness furnishes as experience, Hegel works within
an intra-experiential domain where the metaphysical question of over
lap between cognition and being cannot easily be asked or cogently
answered. Fichte's later philosophy disjoins being and thinking in order
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to think solely about thinking, yet h also continues to talk o f a
nontemporal, nonexpc riential domain that is the ultimate ground o f
empirical selfhood . Hegel eschews all talk of ontological anchoring;
incorporating being as the first thought inside the philosophical deity's
noesis noeseos, he thinks being under the rubric o f "proc ess" inside the
process that is thinking. One philosophy justifies itself by invoking an
outside ground that philosophy itself cannot inspect, the other hy bending
thought into the se rpentine shape of self-reference.
If one brackets Fichte's extra-philosophicaJ a ppeal to a foundation
and ground, he limits the scope of philosophical construction prope r
out of a sense of modesty. Philosoph)' is explanation, a matter of assuming
(on some evidence), constructing, deducing, shaping results, aJJ o f which
is governed by the criteria of cohe rence and comprehensive ness. No
proof of the congruence of the explanation with the exf1licandum can
be give n; all explanation takes place inside their assumed congruence .
This explicit cohere ntism makes the extra-systematic appeal to foundation
e ven more puzzling. Like Kant before him, Fichte 's sense of logic and
of the primacy of prac tice push him to transgress the very line he se ts
up to divide philosophy from nonphilosophy.
In contrast to Fichte's, Hegel's vision of the scope and competence
of philosophy is wider, born of the attempt to recapture the grandeur
of ancient metaphysics. Yet his theory moves within a circle of unex
plained assumptions and unasked questions. 4 Its c riterion of explana
tion is frankly coherentistic. The whole of logic thinks the tota lity of
what is, without any privileged moment of certainty or fac tuality, just
the way Quine argues that the whole of language mirrors reality, without
any one-to-one anchoring of a finite expression in sone disc re te state
of affairs. In his 1827 L ectures on the History of Modem Philosophy. Schelling
se es and clearly states that Hegel's (and his own earlier) philosophy
either left metaphysical question unasked or assumed without anti
skeptical comment the tradition 's mono lithic presuppo sition about the
congruence of being and thinking. The idealist merely thinks about
thinking-a process which for lhe later Schelling does n o l approach
the self-reflec tion of the Aristotelian deity, but just p e rforms the
Leibnizean fraud of minting possibility as good coin. Sc helling rightly
called this .. negative philosophy," an account of what might be the case .5
1. BEING , THE C O UNTERPART O R START ING-PorNT
OF THOUGHT? THOUGHT AND WHAT IS THOUGHT

Both Fichte and Hegel share a basic stance in 1812. Philosophy is ide
alism, a n affair of thought, and its object is itself. But eac h thinker
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defines thought in an importantly different way. For Fichte, thought is
a species of the basic expressive activ1ty of imaging a being. FoT Hegel,
thought is sclf-devclopmenl, the process of determining its determinability
or coming to concreteness.
Fichte defines thinking by the polarity of image and object, or of
positing and positedness:

Thinking is a knowing, a further determination of knowing. In the
Introduction we characterized knowing as a seeing of a being through an
image; so thinking must also bear this general character of knowing ...
Thinking is an imagi,ng that absolu.tely posits an image of itself. One
image = a is not thinka_b le without a further image == b. In this
situation, that it is nothing wiithout this positedness of the other,
lies its essence. ( TL 124).
All cognitive activities presuppose the polarity of activity and object:
To an image corresponds an ima1!ed something ( TL 152) , to an intuition
an image which is its object, to a thought an intuition which is its
object. And as a general law of being, Fichte puts forth the proposition:
Image corresponds to being ( TL 135), which he restates as: There is
appearance, or: I perceive ( ich stelile vor).6
There is little surprising in this framework supposition. It is directly
shown in embodied consciousness, and the task of transcendental logic
is to show the difference between the laws of thought as the framework
for consciousness and the wooden "laws" of judgment and syllogism
delivered by "common logic." Note, however. that Fichte deploys the
complementarity of heing and positing-an-image as a general ontological
framework, prior to the philosophical construction of the empirical I.
It is the dynamic nature of the Bild, the expressed image or form, that
lets Fichte explain the intuitive or "'seeing" nature of all knowing and
ultimately too the way empirical consciousness shapes itself around a
"self.'' He is not perfectly clear about the active nature of images and
imaging in the 1812 text, but in the 1797 / 99 lVissenschaftslehre -nova
methodo he criticizes the failure of all previous philosophies, even the
Kantian, to grasp that consciousness is an "eye," a seeing of itself, a
self-mirroring mirror, not just a medium in which an image is displayed.
lmage or form is noljust reflection as reflected, but reflecting reflection.'
Fichte is not wholly clear on the dynamic or expressive power of
images in the 1812 text, but he at least tries to prevent any confusion
between transcendental and empirical levels of analysis. The lawful
conjunction of image and objec:::t is a necessary feature of being itself,
while consciousness is derivative, i.e., it is an appearance whose factuality
is intelligible because it follows from or falls under this law. 8 In postu-
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lating a general polarity of being and activity/image, Fichte merges
psychology and ontology. In doing so, he also urpasses the "picture
theory" of Spinoza's psychology, where idea primarily is a prese ntaLion
of or report upon ideatum, and only secondarily a report about itself
as reflected reflection, awareness of awareness.9 For Fichte, being is in
itself, thought or knowing is about itself. and the two are everywhere lo
gethe,· because the lau er follows upon the former. 10
In Hegel's philosophy, thought is about itself in a more radi cal way,
since there it has no "outside.'' It is its own content and supplies its
own form or approach. T h ought negates the simple formulae of under
standing, says Hegel, but then, not remaining in the "not," it restores
them to positivity as its universal and concre te conte nt:
This intellectual (geistigel mot.ion that supplies [to thought] its
detenninations in their simplicity and also their identity with it,
which is thereby the immanent development of the Concept, is at
once the absolute method of cognition and the indwelling soul of
[its] contents too. (WLE7/ SL28).
The centrality to being of thinking, or· the unsc para tedness of o n e
from the other, was grasped by the ancient metaphysicians who
unde rstood the kinship of things and of thinking ( WLE 25-26/ SL 45).
The poin t of philosophical learning (or e ducation) is to recover this
insight; the outcome of the Phenomenology of Spirit is the overcoming
of the externality of separating reflection. In othe,- wo rds, what phi
losophizing consciousness has to <lo to attain the standpoint of scie n ce
o r pure thinking is to surpass/ suppress the e rroneous stance of subjec•
tivity, its rootedness in empirical consciousness or the oppositional mode
of conceiving things.
Science is the very antithesis of subjectivity, Hegel claims, or the
separation and re fining of a broader inte grating "self," one rliffc rent
from the agent in appearances which ceaselessly posits and opposes
subject and object. Hegel says emphatically.
Pure science presupposes liberation from the o ppositions of con
sciousness. Il embraces thought in so Jar as it is also the essential
content or the essential content in so Jar as it is pure thought. As science
truth is pure self.developing self-consciousness and has the shape
of a seJf, so that substance and truth ( das an und Jt'ir sich Seiende) is
the known Concept and the Concept is that which is substance and truth
( WLE 30-31 / SL 49) .
Pure thought or Concept is self-as-such, self prior to the oppositional
burden of empirical consciousness. It is radically independent and about
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itself. Like Spinoza's idea, 1t 1s an active thinking, an expression of
cognitive power in its own right; rnnlike Spinoza's idea, it is not essentially
defined in terms of a preexisting ideatu.m or object.
We may contrast the positions of Fichte and Hegel in this way: Fichte
assimilates thinking to representation or imaging, to the expression of
being as object. lt is not alway:s clear in the 1812 lectures that the
originally imaged object is determinability or objectivity in general rather
than a pre-given determinate object. Hegel, for his p~rt, conceives
thinking as a process of delermining the determinable, or of bringing
itself simultaneously to greater universality and individuality. He makes
imaging-object consciousnes.s or mental operations by way of
Vorstellungen, of both cogriitive and appetitive sorts-into a fallen and
parasitic type of thinking. 11
For both Fichte and for Hegd, therefore, what is originally there
for thought to think is something dense, packed, tomplicate,d, something
that comes on the scene as already a synthesis or relation. But, as Hegel
reminds us, if pbilosophy has to begin somewhere, its starting point is
just a starting point, not a first principle {WL 51/ SL 67), and so it is
something simple, obvious, aud given: a first synthesis, an archetypal
relation.

Being in Fichte: image and Object
Fichte's starting-point is thinking itse]f, doubly defined as imaging and
knowing. As image, thought posits an image of itself, and as a species
of knowing, it is the viewing of a being through an image ( TL 124).
There arc three items to note and distinguish in this complicated first
move: the image itself, the awareness of the image, and the opposition
between image and what is expressed within the image. (l) The image:
Fichte makes all cognition-knowledge in general. "seeing," imaging,
intuition, thinking-a matter of dynamic mediation by images. All
knowing involves a "formal ima:ge," and this image includes a reality
that can only be described as "formal hcing." 12 (2) The aware ness carried
with the image: A reflexive moment, an awareness that one is aware,
an image of an image, is built into the primary activity of seeing, imaging,
and so fortbY (3) The image and imaged polarity: The identity and
difference of image aud what is imaged 1 which steps forth into awareness
in the very imaging, is what is important for further philosophical analysis
(since the formality of the repn~sentational approach closes off other
avenues of philosophical queslioning). One gets to the conviction that
knowing is anchored in being in some sense, or that image-awareness
is awareness of something beyond the image, only through the
presentation of this polarity in llhe consciousness of Lhe image.

Fichte brings these three elements together in the following summary text:
Seeing [or knowing] in general is absolute image-being tabsolu.tes
BildseinJ . • .. An image posits an i,maged, as surely as it is. Now it
also pertains to seeing that this illllage, just as surely as it is, un
derstand itself as image, and only thereby, in and through the
contrast, understand what is imaged; not image, but being. Only
this pertains to seeing in general.
Differences in the seeing stem from the inner nature of the
absolutely real l.\ 'eimdes) image; what follows from this inner formal
being ( of the image] becomes it.~1 imaged counterpart ( TL 392) .
The text goes on to elaborate two possibilities for the imaged c ounter
part: If it is dead, finished, ready at hand, and lifeless, it is the Jactiral
image, the domain of empirical reality. If it living, activity, and a facility
for itself producing images, it is thinking, the vision which has eye s for
only the law, not for th e facts. When the two are brought together,
factical intuition and intellectual thought, philosophy or Wissenschafts/,ehre
can comprehend appearance by producing the factical image from its
grounds, genetically deriving it flrom its law. Appe arance is then
comprehende d as at once an image of itself and an image o f its
counterpart, the being which is beyond all appearing ( TL 393).
lt is difficult to assess this complicated starting-point as a program
for transcendental philosophy in general, and even more difficult lo
follow the analytic resolution (whic:h Fichte calls a "genesis") of this
initial knot of image-being in to all its discrete moments. Fichte's talk
of image, image-being, images of images, formal being, and of an
ultimately incongruent relation of complementarity betwee n appear
ance and reality is metaphysical, no t psychological language. He is not
doing phenome nology, if phenomenology is the analysis of structures
of subjectivity that takes the subjec t as the underlying ground of the
giveness of what appears. The whole force of Fichte's analysis is to
make the e mpirical subject even more evanescent and impermanent
than the realm of appearances, to make the empirical self but one
item in a stream of appearings. Bu1 if Fichte does not wish to
substantialize the subject, neither dloes he wish to ascribe any endur
ing reality status to the flow of images which occur out of, about, and
on the perimeter of being. Images, which are about themselves (and
thus eventually incubate subjects) and about being, cannot be called
to philosophical account-at least in that second aspect where they
are said to be about that which in principle escapes them: viz., p e rma
nent, self~ nclosed being. They can, ouce given or presupposed, be
1
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mustered and marshaled to explain the factual exis.tence of the em
pirical self and its world, but they cannot be derived from any ground
of being. Only factical consciousness can be explained in its factidty.
Says Fichte,
The empirical is indeed comprehensible in its existence, but not
at all in its determinacy. This incomprehensibility, hence abso
luteness for the intellect {Verstand}, is that which ever has and ever
will tempt us to take it for absolute being, which has occasioned
all dogmatism and nature-philosophy among us (TL 314).

Being in Hegel: Tho11,ght's. Beginning
If Fichte's starting-point is the relation between image and imaged
object given in thinking, whose density includes an element of self
giveness, and so of added complexity, Hegel's point of departure is
equally dense, although it gives itself out as the simplest and the most
obvious o~ject for thought.
The situation is more complicated than I have just described it: Hegel's
beginning, the immediate category of being, is both dense and ~imple. 14
It is simple, or apparently simp)e, because thought must begin as
Parmenides did from the judgment: It is and cannot not be. Says Hegel,

The beginning must be absolute, or what is the same in this context,
it must be abstract. It should presuppose nothing, be mediated by
nothing, nor have a ground, since it is rather to he the ground
for the whole of philosophic science .... The beginning is there
fore pitre being ( WLE 54/ SL 70).
·
But being is complicated as well. Taken outside the artificial disjunc
tion of the Parmenidean dilemma, being can be thought only as the
abstract counterpart (and extensional equivalent) of nothing, and so
only as a moment artificially isolated from the oscillation back and
forth that goes on in becoming or process. Hegel expresses the complicated
situation with great care and brevity:
Pure being and pure nothing are th•u s the same. What the truth is, is
neither being nor nothing, but the fact that being goes over into
nothing, and nothing into being-or does not goes over but has
[already] gone over. But neither is the truth that they arc undi
vided from each other. They are not the same, they are absolutely
distinguished, but are just the same undivided and indivisible; each
immediate(v disappears into its oj1posite counterpart. Their truth is thus
the motion of their immediate disappearance into each other: process
( WLE 67/ SL 82-83).
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HegeJ's immediat or implest category is a ailab.le only in vanishing
form, as an analy and from a complicated relational situation that is
t o chaotic or unstable really ev n to de rv the nam synthesis. It is
the classic intellectual as of Heisenb rgian indeterminac ; one need
only think being to put it in motion, in fact to make it disappear.
To make matter. worse, not only is Heg l's beginning materially
polyvalent (because it is conceptually botb d nse and simple), the formal
requirement that thought tart its cone ptual and abstra t thinking
with the simplest and most immediate is iLSelf the complicaced outcom
of a previous investigation, The Phenomenology of Spirit, whose precarious
and uncertain subjectivity, once complet d falls back upon itself and
becomes the simplest. most immediate th ught of the simplest, immediate
object. Hegel xplains the formal po i tion of the knower in th Logic
as follows:
In that work [the Phenomenology] immediate consciou ncs is whac
is first and imm diate in the science, and thus its presupposition.
But in the Logic the presupposition is that which proved iLc;;elf to
be the resul of the earlier con ideration-the Idea of pure know
ing, Logi,c is pure science, that is, pure knowing in the total ambit of
its d elopm nt. In th e earlier result this Idea defined itself as
the certajn y which has b come truth. On the ne hand , it is no
longer over against the object, hut has internalized it and knows
it as itself. On the lher hand, knowing has given up b ing opposed
to the object and being only the object's negation; it has divested
itself of this [s rt of] subjectivity and is at one with itll dive titure
( WLE 53/SL 69) .

On the formal side, then, the knower in the initial phase of che l,ogi.r
is ne who has surrend red he st.a.nee of subjectivity (which includes
point of view, depend e nc on prcjudi s and presuppositions, and
uncertainty). She has gone ov r to the simplicity of absolute knowing
or int llecmal in tuilion, as the collapse of the richnes and contracHc
tion of her own exp riential ascent to it. 15
Both from the formal and the material ide then, or considered in
terms of the quality of thinking and the quality of the object thought,
HegeJ's beginning is a simplicity dense with surmounted and yet to b
unfolded omplexity. It has implicitly. again b th on the material an d
I.he formal sides, the relational structures-transitive, reflective, and
organically elf-r fer ntial-that chara terize the unfolding of the Logic
as a whole.
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2. THOUGHT: EMPTY FORMALITY OR SELF-

SPECIFICATION? FICHTE AND HEGEL: THE DIFFERENCE

We have seen that Hegel and Fichte make comparable initial moves in
their 1812 Logi,cs, especially with respect to the category of being. Both
define metaphysical or transcendental logic as the project of thought
considering itself, and both begin with an analysis of an item that is
both an initial object (or immediate situation) and a principle for further
reflection. For Fichte. the beginning is positing a general polarity of
being and expression or image, for Hegel, the barest concept, being,
as involved in the first concrete object of thought, p rocess. For both
thinkers, being stands apart from the process of its elaboration. For
Fichte it is ineffable vis-a-vis the seeing that folJows upon it, while for
Hegel it is sub-effahle, too laden with the positive (but unarticulated)
character of universal determinability to be anything for thought, that
universal power or activity whose heing is to distinguish. For both
thinkers, too, the thought-process that is philosophy is an activity elicited
by being. For Fichte, it is a schema or image of God, the translation
of being into life, while for Hegel, the indeterminate positivity of what
merely is occasions the first "No" of thought's difference and its first
twining of positivity and negativity into the embrace of contradiction.
For both thinkers, then, thought happens in, about, away from being.
It elaborates in an "elsewhere" of its own invention the determinacy,
super-determinacy, even sheer contradiction of what merely and
absolutely is.
The major difference that distinguishes the two philosophers in 1812
is the question of the origin of determinacy, and of the agency that
transforms determinability into determinateness. The issue is whether
thought is empty, constrained only ,genera11y by rational laws and depen
dent on sensibility or empirical constraints for its fu)l determination
the Kantian model of our cognitive faculties, which Fichte follows-or
whether, instead, thought contains the whole mechanism of its .self
determinalion and is thus a fully independent and self-realizing process.
We saw earlier Lhat in the malte1· of being, Fichte seemed to give a
transcendent as well as a transcendental referent to the term-God
on one hand, the being of images on the other-while Hegel conceived
it as but a moment in thinking, 01· purely transcendentally. But when
it comes to defining or fixing the place of thought, Fichte confines
himself to the struclures of thinking that explain experiential conscious
ness, while Hegel seems to locate thinking beyond the plane of
experience's eventuating (which can only happen for a subject, an
individual or social instance of Geist). As we shall see, there is some

ambiguity to this "beyond.'' It can be read as the otherworld of dog
matic metaphysics or (correctly) as the "elsewhere" of transcendental
formality, embodied in, e .g., rules, laws, institutions, cognitive meth
odologies, and yearning for the good. Hegel is dear in his contention
tha t thought achieves ~oncreteness i n an initially wholly abstract way,
as the logical Concept that undergoes the process of becoming both
substance and subject, or Idea. Hegel's Idea is subjecthood, but is nei
ther a nor the support or enjoyer of e xperience.
Before I explore this difference in greater detail, I wish to set aside
two texts in Fichte's 1812 Logic that make him seem to be executing
Hegel's philosophical program. In one, Fichte speaks as if he were
proposing to do Hegelian logic, i.e., to display the necessary intertwin
ing of the basic concepts of metaphysics as the self-referential life and
work of the one Concept or thought moving them. He corrects himself,
however, and says it makes no difference whether and how one derives
the multitude of concepts: "We have earlier on complete ly r eje cted
this division of common logic. Jt woul<l have concepts without a
conceiving. This is a palpable absurdity'' (TL 332) . What transcendental
logic does instead is to conceive conceiving, i.e., to comprehend thinking
as established by the laws of the being of appearance, to explain it as
the understanding of se nsible images delivered by intuition. There is
no deduction of the categories, strictly speaking, in the J812 Tmnszen.
dentale Logik, and there are only three concepts-sensibility, pure thought,
and space, mediating between the other two ( TL 334).
In another text, Fichte speaks of the concept (or thought) in terms
that make it sound like Hegel's self-mediating Concept:
All actual thinking is this synthetic unity, Lhus a syllogism. The re
is no concept without judgment and syllogism ISchluss I, for the
concept is only in a conceiving, hence in a judging, while all
judgment proceeds under a law and is thus a concluding fro m
the law, an application of it to the case at hand. Conversely there
is no judgmen t without concept, for it [too] is a [mode or]
conceiving or grasping, from which the concept gets its name.
That the judgment is not without a drawing of a conclusion was
asserted in the first proposition ( TL 330).

The syllogistic structure of which he speaks he re is no t Conceptual in
Hegel's sense; it is not the rational syllogism where every one of the
three terms mediates be tween the other two as extremes. 16 It is in
stead a garden-variety argument that subsumes a case under a law or
principle . The empirical T is said to be a syllogism be cause it emerges
from the subsumption of a factical intuition (sensibility and the images
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depicted in it) under the intellectual intuition of a law. Conversely,
the formal syllogism is said to be an analytic or formal reproduction,
in discursive fashion, of the original unity of cognition ( TL 380). While
Hegel thinks of the syllogistic nature of the Concept as its ability
to unite universality and individuality, freedom and positedness (see
WLZ 220-21 /SL 583), Fichte thinks in Kantian terms of the intellectual
domain as the subsumption of individual images or intuitions under
laws ( TL 319).
I now return to the differences between Fichte's and Hegel's ideas
of logic as a process of thought'~• sdf-reflection. For Fichte, although
thought or expression is in its formal reality independent and self
sufficing, a living and active translation of Being's (or God's) ineffable
reality, on the side of content or it.s. concrete determination, the concept
remains empty, a matter of pure formality, the mere ordering of sensible
intuitions. For Hegel, on the other hand, thought is the power of the
rational, self-specifying whole. It is not reflection or image, and its
determinacy is not derived from a passive picturing of the determinacy
of finite objects. It is more than the mere formal association of the
materially dissociated, i.e., an indistinct reproduction of a multitude
of distinct sensations. The Concept's determination-freed from the
externality
11perficial connection seen in the categories of "Being"
and from the futile attempts of ••Essence" to attain self-grounding in
the Spinozistic mode (as substance, not as subject)-is a matter of its
self-concretization, of its positing difference within itself as genus, and
of its existence as concrete and universal in the individual ( WLZ 24448/ SL 604-08).
.

°'

Fichte: Lat':fidness or Empty Generality
Fichte remains the good Kantian, for whom concepts without intui
tion are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind. Thought or
concept, as he indifferently ca11s it, is always connected to factical image,
to intuition, to the image of determinate quality displayed in space or
matter. Says Fichte,
There is no pure thought, only an understanding. All thinking without
exception is a synthesis of thought with some fact-positing intui
tion. This is the fundamental law (which we should also universally
convert, saying that there is a '.l so no intuition without thinking).
This is what we have done here; we did not leave the thought
image \Denkbild} of the image up in the air, but allowed it to be
produced and engendered from ab [the complex of awareness and
affect] ( TT., 277).
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Thought and intuition, recall, are both kinds of images. Intuition has
the dynamic structure of an image-expression of an image; thought is
an image of intuition; mediating hetween the two is the concept of
space, which makes possible the display of quality. In the philosophi
cal thought-process that Fichte undertakes, everything that is ope n to
analysis turns out to have this acti 1ve and expressive image-structure.
Converse ly, the only thing not open to analysis this way is original
determination, which is variously saiid t.o he beyond any accounting, as
a nonconstructible and incomprehensible q1.wle ( TL 300), or to be a
direct determination by the absolute, as is m o rality. 17
What does thought (or concept) contribute to the structure of em
pirical consciousness? It furnishes apperception, the unity of the factical
image and the intellectual image of images ( TL 276); in this general
capacity it is called intellect or Vers1iand. In m o re specific functions, it
provides for sensibility (inner and iouter sense), for the lawfulness of
appearance's location in space ( TL 335), for time or the reproduction
of factual contents in the relation of before and after ( TL 342), and for
the unity of the I on the subjective side and the community of beings
on the objective side of perception ( TL 348, 351). Natural power and
the products of nature-physical, m1echanical, chemical. and organic
all emerge from the lawfulness of nature . Even the human person as
body and soul, as a psyche that wills according to determinate Jaws,
must be grasped as part of nature or the realm of un<lerstanding. "Of
course," adds Fichte, "one has to foi·m a better concept of nature than
as if it were some dead material. One must conceive it precisely a s a
spiritual entity. Nature is a formal expression IBildl of absolute ap
pearance; it is as surely as this is; ;and the pinnacle of nature is the
human b eing, the expression of the :succession of absolute motion from
the wiU" ( TL 362).
In all these cases, however, Fichte attributes to thought nothing more
than the imposition of lawfulness oc order upon a sensible determina
tion that is factically intuited. Intellect is but. a mirror, the expressive
organization of images determined e lsewhe re-we know not how. Fichte's
philosophy thus remains focused on and anchored in the empirical.
All of its effort is directed toward tlhe redescription of empirical con
sciousness, i.e., to the genetic deduction of its that, not its wherefor·e,
toward furnishing the law of its fo,rmal being (or appearance), nol
that of its reality or determination ( TL 313). The vehicle of philosophical
lhought. inteJlectuaJ intuition, cmer1ges only as an<l in factical intuition
of an empirical self, and only in inttuilion of factical determination is
there a comprehe nsion of a self ( TL 281). Philosophy is limited Lo the
ilJumination of the e mpirical self.
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He..~~l: Thought Thinkin.g Itself
Hegel defines the Concept as the foundation and truth of objectivity,
and objectivity-comprising the linear structures of Being and the
relational ones of Essence-as the genesis or coming to be of the Concept
(WLZ 213-14/SL 577). It seems to be a malter of Lhe addition of
significance to what there is. Since the whole of objectivity, organized
and coordinated as totality, is substance, an d substance as social is a
matter of lawful interaction or necessity, the Concept is also defined
as the point of transition between necessity and freedom. "Thus the
Concept is the truth of substance, and since substance has necessity for
its specific mode of relation, freedom reveals itself as the truth of necessity
and as the mode of relation proper to the Concept" ( WLZ 214/ SL 577-78) .
Hegel's Concept carries connotations of selfhood, individuality, sub
jectivity, and sociality that Fichte's wooden notion of lawful ordering
did not admit. But another note in Hegel's defini6on of the Concept
that is .closer to Fichte's is that it is a comntutation between the
phenomenal "freedom" of appearing/acting and the necessity of
positedness or facticity ( Gesetztsein). Substance, explains Hegel, returns
to itself in and out of its positedness, realizes its causality as appearance
or the play of reflection, thus perfects and completes itself as substance
and goes over into freedom (WLZ214-l6/SL578-80). ''This completion
is no longer substance itself, but something higher, the Concept, the
subject'' ( WLZ 216/ SL 580). At this point where thought grasps itself as
an organism or social substance whose causal power passes over into
freedom and sn~jectivity, Hegel seems to surpass the empirical limits
of Fichte's understanding of understanding. The Concept is the logical
aspect of the Absolute, or is pure thought in on its way to self
comprehension as absolute Idea. Those are Hegel's words, literally
construed. How are we to understand and evaluate the emptiness of
Fichte's thought over against its asserted substantiality in Hegel?
One is perhaps in danger at this poim of being beguiled by some of
Hegel's most sweeping, grand, and affect-laden language. Who or what
it is that thinks the absolute Idea? Is it my personal I? Or is it the
human community, the collectivity of language-users, laborers, and
culture-mediated biologies? O:r is it some spirit or thing beyond? Positive·
answers to all these questions must be ruled out, not just by the will
not to see Hegel as a relapsed dogmatic, but by the text of The Science
of Logfr itself.
The Concept at which Hegel arrives in the culmination of thought's
odyssey is "thought thinking itself' in a paradoxically abstract and con
crete way. 18 It is logical thought, and so has an abstract universality suited
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to diverse but unspecified real modes of thought; this abstract univer
sality corresponds to rhe "formality" claimed by conventional logic. The
Concept is concrete thought not because it is about detached episodes of
finite experience or so-called concreta, but because it has elaborated
its own determinacy to the point where diKerentiae integrate themselves
into one another without exclusion o r opposition, as do the related
species within a natural kind and the unrelated species within a
functioning ecology. It is about itself in a way both self-refermtial and
empty of real contents (physica l, psychic, or social), because it is logi
cally reflective, or a meditation on method. AU these marks, that it is
logical, concrete, and self-referential thinking, fall on the side of thought's
form, namely, that i t is thinking or thinking of X, not on the side of
thought's content-e.g., that it is thought of nature, o r finite spirit, or
spirit as I, or spirit as political community, or spirit as the object of art
and religion.
What content Hegel chooses to give to thought in the unfolding of
the purely logical life of the absolute Idea is terrestrial rather than
extra-terrestrial. Thought's power is absolute and its domain is the
infinite, but in The Logi.c itself philosophical thinking works itself beyond
the (logically an<l his torically prior) fallacious concrctization of the
infinite as a "beyond'' or "oLherside" of the finite. The culmination of
Hegel's logic shows thought returned to itself infinite in its finite forms.
The coment of the Logic's concluding section, "Th e Concept," is
once Hegel gets beyond a tedious reworking of the materials of common
logic, a fancy that Fichte too indulges- (}) a review of th e methodol
ogies of natural, social, and human sciences (mechanism, chemism,
teleology) under the name of "Objectivity," (2) an overview of human
cognition in its double appearance as the knowing su~ject and as the
pull of normative ideas upon her, and finally (3) a methodological
self-reflection about The l.ogi,c itself. This last is a return to the initial
essay on the possibility of a beginning, on the equivalence of result
and starting-poinl, and the uJtimale convertibility of immediacy and
mediation. There is no flying beyond the ambit of possible experience
or humanly imerpretable meaning, no flight from lhe life world, despite
Platonic language and honorific words from the tradition such as tPleology
and idea. The doctrine of the Concept in the Science of Logic is as little
transcendent in its contents as Kant's "Doctrine of Method" is meta
physical in the c onclusion of The Critique of P1.1.r1> Reason. Conceptuality
is an emergent phenomenon, supervenient on nothing's infection of
being, necessity's nauowing of freedom, and on a society's and a culture's
destining of the brief lives of its members. The freedom and subjectiv
ity of the Concept arc another version of the fatality of t.he whole.
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CONCLUSION : THE fJNITUDE OF THOUGHT

Hegel 's Logic i in the end just a poignant a meditation on human
limitation as is Fichte's. Fichte se ms to wax metaphy ical when h
postulates the components of the syn thesis of consciousness (expres
sion, image, knowing, thought, etc.) whose analysis is the prop r task
of Wissenschaftslehre. At the periphery of what can Jegi imately be philo
sophically explained, his l nguage becomes the logi al-that reas n
can only dictate the schemata of spa 'e and time while experience must
supply facti al determination is an interesting interpretation of the
doctrine of the Incarnation-but Fichte 1s properly philosophical in
t rest is lhe explanatory reconstruction of the facts of experiential con
sdousn s. Much the same might be aid for Hegel. Like contemporary
postmetaphysical philosophers. each enacts thought out of a background
tradi lion of grand r claims than can b sustained and loftier language
than an be deciphered. Both thinker finally resign themselves, I be
lieve, to a world empty of theological consolations and to a prnxis of
postmetaphysica l attempts t become beuer adju ted to finite life, un
certain action, and cognition lacking any, save social, guarantees. That
philosoph
need still pr crib such therapeutic regimes for themselves
today as Fichte and H g l did in 1812 testifies against the myth of
progress. What is truly admi, ble and conceptually graceful in the nine
teenth c ntury think rs is lhat they so adroitly used the resources ch
tradition s metaphysical and theological languages t stimulate the intel
lect's quest for wholeness and ompletion while simultaneously disso
ciating the satisfaction of Lhat taste from world-denying pseudo-objects.

NOTES

l. G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik Erster Teil, ed. Georg Lassan, (Ham
burg: Meiner Verlag, .1967). Hereafter cited
WLE. Hegel 's cience of Logic,

crans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands , NJ.: Humanitie Press, 19 9).
Hereafter SL.
Fo a bri f dis ussion of the difference between Lh first dition of
Wisse-nschaft d~r Logik (1812: "Obje tive Logic," Book I; 1813: "Objeclive
Logic , Book rI; 1816: ' Subjective L gic") and the second edition of the
first book, "Die Lehre vom Sein" (18 2), se Giacomo Rin ldi, A History
wuf. hiter-pretntion of the logic of Hege4 (Lewiston , N.Y.: Mellen, 1 92) 105-07.
F r the purpos of discussion, an positions and arguments found in
the Srience of Logic will be treated
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cation date of "The Doctrine o f Being ." All translations which appear in
this paper are mine. George di Giovan:ni , Jeffery Kinlaw, and Gfmter Zoeller
s~1pplied h e lpful com ments o n an ealrlier· d raft of this paper.
Uber das Verhaltniss der Logik zttr Philosoiphie oder Tra11-su:ndental 1.og;il< in Johann
Gottlieb Fichtl''s nachgelassene Werke. ed. I.. H . Fichte, Vol. J (Berlin: de Gruhter,
1962) . Cited hereafter as TL.
Bardili offered a naturalistic or evolutio nary view of logic, whi c h located
coexistence, affinity, opposition, unity, order, and above all, identity in
natllral beings given in presentation . Thought inverts their order, e .g.,
c hanging the natural order of impu lse, actuality, possibility into the logical
order of possibi1ity, actnality, impullse. Re inhold a ba ndoned the tra ns
cendental stance late in 1799 for this new realism. See "BardUi an Reirihold,
1 January 1800" in C. G. Bardili & C. L. Reinhold, Briefwechsrl iibe,· das
Wesen der PhilosophiP. 1.md das linwesen ,der Spekulation (Miinc hen: J. Len mer,
1804) , 14-16, 32, 44-5.
Hegel is able to defend himself against the tone, but not the suhstance,
of the objection that systematic philosophy is finally a literary or ideological
productio n . His basic question, first ;rnnounced in the Earliest German Sys
tem Program, is: How must the world lbe in order to support the exis1ence
of a free being? His philosophy "sh o ws" that both the world-p rocess and
che reality acldressed in the Logic is thought, that the two are in congruence
as totalities. These claims are normati"e, not factual. The fact that H egelian
thought is more agile than other phillosophcrs have conceived tho ught lo
be, thus apparemly able to think throu.gh even the contradiction of freedo m
and necessity, does not undo the precarious anthroporentrism o f thoug ht's
narcissistic self-presupposing.
Fichte's idealism makes the same m o ve , but its o mological commitment
to the ingredience of thought in reality is made in the more modesl Kantian
language of appeal lo rules, or to lawfulness in general as a meta physical
foundation. Fic hte claims for Wi.ssen.schaftslehrf''S th ought a preemi nence
over sensible intuition in lhar p erception mere ly is and reproduces an
image of being's original appea-rance•, while philosophy understands t hat
image as a consequence ofa rule (TL .396). "Hence we have comprehended
and understood the empirical do main in its inmost essence and its true
significance when we see iL produced from its laws. No mere em pirical
philosophy can do this. It has o nly the ima ge; we have it (derived] from
its laws, and so with its m eaning" (TL 393).
See Sche lling 's tre atment of WL in .Zu.r Geschichte tfer newrren Philo,,·ophie:
Mii:nchnur Vorv.sungen, in &hellings Wenke (Munich: Beck, 1965) 10: 126- 152.
At one point SchelHng comments tha1 the m ost Hege l could have don e is
to show that the Idea is tbe nega tive of real existence. the necessary co n
ditio n without which noth ing could exist. From this, Lhough, it does not
follow that anything exists. 'Tbe whole world lies as it we re within the
nets of intellect or reason, but t.he que stion is this: How h as it com e
within those nets? For there is evidently something other and som e thing
more in the world than mere reaso n, i ndee d somelhing straining agai nst
these boundaries" (SW 10: 143-44) .
In a relatively lucid summ a ry passage, Fichte d escribes his project :
We are looking for the role thinkin:g plays in the primordial knowing,
and w e have pursued this 1.ask back to the formula: Appearance must
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view 'itself as the viewing agelnt ( das 8ehende) absoluitely.. .. It nmst
view iueff a& the viewer. ( TL '.2·62).
Upon further analysis, Fi:chte ,co•nc.Judes there are two seeings or 1/iewiugs
ingredient in appearance, one necessitated, one free. Th,e fir.st is intuition,
1the .second thought:.
7. J. G. Fic:l:1,t e, Gesa:mta,u:sgabe der Bayerischen /\kademie de1r Wissenschaften, -e d.
R. Lauth ,& H . GHwitzsky. IV. Kolfognachschriften, 2 (Stuttgart: fr,ommann

Holi:boo.g, 1978) 48-49.
The same d-ynamic character of ithe being~imag-e relation is insl:an.ced
ag.a-i:n in the same work in Fichte's discussion of how space c-o mes to he
within intuition as the schema or ratLonal imag,e of the l's activiity. It is
detennined by the laws of :reas:c,)n and displays activity as pu.re agi«.iity,, the
.infinite exten.s'ion
.
of the_ line i.n every cliirecti-on., or empty space (GA lV.
2: WO- H11 :1.
For· ain mum~nating discussi:o n of how reflecting reneaion roediiates be
tween life and nounfe, inner and outer, and constitutes (he very center
of all knowing see Ei?ile-itumgsvorlesungen in die Wisse,:ischaftslehre (1813) i:n
fiichte's nadvg1:lt1sse111: Werke, ed, l. H . Fkh:te <Bonn; Ma1n.1.s, 1834} l: 45-51.
8 . See TL 213, where Fichte ,e xplains thait in the genetic or phH:o:soph.it:al
account of appearance, .t'he 1 appears latJe ,o n th,e sn:ne, havii,Jg as
predecessors or components the -intuhive i mage (which reflects the factua.l
situation) and the intdlection or the thought t.fu.ereof. "The first image,
re,t ei\'ed into the seccmd., ex.pre:sses itseU: •.r posit 1nyse,l f absolutely.'"
This passa:ge is (m,e of the .few in the Tw·ns.zendentale Logik where the l nl4
.l anguage of I, not-I, and pos.iting occurs. S-ee also TL 234 .
'9. Spinoza did hold that there is a formal s-ort of awaneness of awairenes.s or
reflectivity that goes a)ong with .an.y knowledge, hut this seems
propositional-"lf p, then 1 know that p, etc.''-a,nd not a matter pf knowing
what .mind or idea itr; see Ethics 2, :21. [de.a :i~ idea of body, !bodies are
composed of matte1r,; maue,r is unknowable . .Hen-c.e Jhe idea of any
modification of body does not lbirin.g whh it foll knowledge of th..e body
( Ethics 2, 27), nor does the idea of th.is modi fication of the human body
involve adequate knowledge of the hum:au m.iud (Eth ics 2., 29).
10. l n la:ier version:s o f the Wissenschaftslehre, the irnag-e ,r elation between bein,g
an<l knowing is ex.presse<l in theologicail, mof'e specific.ally Christologkal
terms, as in this passage from Vie Wisse:tl'sdtn:ftslehre in .i.h:rem aitge,nwii,,e:1:1
1

Umrisse ( 1810)·:

Now if 1here were lo be knowing, without it lb eiug G(}d h .imse:Jf. it
:c ould m~ly be Goe! himsdf, slinc_e ther-e, is rwthi.~g nthe~ thc1;n G~r~,
hut ou1ts1de God hunself; the b.e1ng of God 011ts1de of hts bemg; )us
m.<toifestatio~t, hi w.h ich he :is wholly what he is, .-if7!d yet in h-imsdf
mm.aim wholly what he is. But such a manifestation is an image or
schema. (Siin11lfrhe 'Wetke. ed. 1[. H. Fichte (Berlin: 1-845) 2: 696).

'The being-+m.age ,. conuast in Fichte's later metaphysics its similar rn ithe
We.fen-form d1stinctim11 Sch,elli,ng employs in b.iis jdentity ph:ilosnpby: see

Bruno in .Sche.Uings We:rke 4: 2.3 8-39. Hegel bri mand)' dispby~ the com
plete formality .tiild fh,idity of such category -distinctiions in hiis chapiter on
.. AbsohHc Ground,'' Wissemr:ha/J d-er LCJgik,, Zwe.it.er Tei/ (Hamburg: Mei.ner,
J96.6) 66-76; hercafiter ci.t-ed as Wl~Z,
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11. Hegel expresses lhis insigh t more gracefully in the Preface added for the
second edition in 183l. In the common anthropological situation,· hu
mans feel that they are their fedings, that their d esires and aspirations
are their lives, but Lhat they e nte1r the realm of abstract thought only with
great diffic ulty and under compulsion . When one comes to appreciate
the universality and freedom which i.s only in thought, c.>ne encou11ters
Lhe difficult but true thought that finite consciousness is "had" or sup
ported by thinking and universality. Ego is adjectival to thought, and is
the active universal only because the universal power of thought pervades
all ( WLE 14-15/ SL 35).
Fichte is no friend of individual or idiosyncrntic subjectivity either. It is
the skeptic who pri zes her idiosyncratic self and elevates her observations
into generalizations. fn t he humble thinker, individuality is sacrificed, of
fered up to the eternal, "but not i1n so far as this appears in another (which
really is not even possible) but because it appears in himself" (TL 231) .
12. Fichte's ontologica1 commitments are clear in the 1812 lectures. There
arc two forms o f being: true being, which is absolutely self-contained and
selr-determined, and relative being, which is nothing other than relation,
connection, negatio1i ( TL 206-07). They are related as reality and appear
ance. All the steps of the g,enctic deduction in the WissenschaflslehrR belong
to the latter, for they are all pure i1mage. and pertain to the general domain
of Erscheimmg which they explain . Images and philosophical explanations
thereof presuppose some b eing or reality that they are about, but they
are empty images of this being; they have the being of analyses or conreptual
contrasts ( Tl 205) . To confuse absolute and relative being, or reality and
appearance is as deplorable a mistake as confusing one's feet with the
relation "large or small" one use.s to describe them.
13. Sense in general and the five specific senses and their o bjects illustrate
this structure. Along with the image of a sensible qua lity comes a general
image of the sense, and, within o ne specific sense, say that of sight. one
is aware of red only as contrasted with other determinate ways of chopping
up the general determinability or color affects ( TL 242). Spinoza was the
first to point o ut that awareness of x entails awareness of awareness of x.
14. Hegel explains there is a twofold sense in which philosophy faces "the
proble m of lhe beginning," one being the search for th e p rinc iple, the
universal governing the facts of a d omain. the other the search for a
psychological ground of certainty in the methods, procedures. and re
sults of a cognitive discipline. The first is the concern of the ancients in
their struggle to grasp and formulate Lhc arc/ti or archai of a science. The
latter is a peculiarly modern corncem. the uncertain spawn of Cartesian
foundationalism and its bastard sibling. metaphysical skepticism. Both
problems can be resolved simullLaneously if and only if what is first in
thought is also first for thought ( WLE 51-52/ SL 67) .
Hegel seems to make the famiJitar stipulation that what assuredly counts
as knowledge must be belief which is both true and justilied, i.e .• certain
or held with adequate warrant. The Phtmomrnology may be see n as a labo•
rious educative project wherein lthe subject, the soul packed with preju·
dices or unquestionE"d presuppositions, is brought to evidential adequacy
so that, in the end, it is Anally suited to be introduced to trnlh or a bso
lute content, i.e., it is ready to begin to think.. Set> WLE 30/ SL 49.
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15. Both Schelling and Hegel, from the earliest days of identity philosophy,
held the comple mentary convictions that there was one and only one Phi
losophy, not plural philosophies contrived by idiosyncratic individual think
ers, and that the sine qua non for thinking or moving in that one philosophy
was the sacrifice of subjectivity in the sense of merely personal or idiosyn
cratic points of view. See F. W. J. Schelling, Fernere Darstellu,ngen aus de1n
System der Philosaphie ( 1802) in Schellings Werke4: 351-52 and G. W. F. Hegel,
The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, trans. H. S.
Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977) 88-89. Says Hegel
there: "The essence of philosophy .. . is a bottomless abyss for personal
idiosyncrasy. In order to reach philosophy it is necessary to throw oneself
into it a rorps perd~t-meaning by body here the sum of one's idiosyncracies."
16. The unfolding of the three fonns of Hegel's syllogism (formal, reflective,
and necessary) progressively universalizes the connective function of the
middle term so that it is simultaneously a unifying and a totalizing of
different determinations. The upshot is that the Concept is realized and
objectified, delivered from a formal mode of being to a substantial one.
( WLZ 351-52/ SL 703). The syllogism is mediation, the complete Concept
in its being posited. Its movement is the abolition of this mediation, in
which nothing is in and for itself, but each term is only by means of
another. Hence the result is an fo1mediacy which has emerged from the
abolition of mediation .. . This being is therefore a complex {Sacltel that is
in and for itself-objectivity ( WLZ 352/ SL 704). See also the treatment of
syllogism undt-i- the title of method, WLZ 497-99/ SL 836-38.
17. In a strange passage Fichte argues from a qualitative structure common
to both sensibility and morality, viz., that each is determined from without,
to the idea that the source of both is the Absolute, and that, accordingly.
"in the fonn of mere sensibility we have the formal image IBildforml of
morality, in that both have in common that they are absolutely qualitatively
determined expressions IBilderl which appearance carries with it in its
very being" ( TL 307). Everything that appears for consciousness does so
within the unfolding flow of appearance, yet the sensory and intellectual
contents, the factical this is and the intelligible that ought not be, are, both
of them, definite and unyielding.
18. The soltaion I offer to the charge that Hegel reifies and individualizes
thinking as a subjfcl answers the problem within the confines of the Science
of Logic. It. does not address the problem of the transition between logic
and philosophy of nature, or of tbe Concept that in its complete freedom
liberates itself into tht- real a1terity of nature and completes its liberation
by coming to itself as subject ( M..Z 505-06/ SL 843-44). When the Concept
is subject.ified in this manner it seems ripe for the theological metaphors
(if they are metaphors) which 1ink the parts of the system in the Enz.yklopiidie
der philo.sophischen Wissensc/iajten and which Schelling early on attacked at
the weakest point of the system . ':Jacobi could hardly make something
more vile of nature than Hegel made of it in contrast to the logical, from
which he excluded it and to which he can still do nothing other than
oppose it. There is in the Idea utterly no necessity for such a movement,
no reason in itself for some further progression; it simply must wrench
itself away from itself" (Schellings Werke 10: 152) .

